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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the financial and economic crises, 
EU and national policy-makers have been 
preoccupied with enacting measures to aid 
economic recovery and the consolidation of EU 
Member States’ economies. Today, investment 
gaps remain a concern when it comes to 
stimulating economies, in particular in Member 
States where the repercussions of the crises are 
still being felt. While there is no ‘silver bullet’ 
policy measure that will make EU economies 
function at their real potential, new financial 
stimulation mechanisms might prove efficient 
remedies against the poor competitiveness and 
economic sluggishness that affect the EU’s 
overall economic performance. EU Member 
States – along with EU institutions – have 
shown a great deal of financial ingenuity in 
stimulating EU economies into becoming 
interconnected and competitive.  
Two elements are relevant to the current debate 
over the concerted actions intended to close 
economic discrepancies and boost economic 
potential: the Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) and the European Fund for Strategic 
Investment (EFSI). This policy brief will look 
into the potential overhaul of the MFF timeline, 
its structure in the context of new instruments 
such as the EFSI, and the strategic combination 
of different EU financial tools intended to 
stimulate and interconnect economies across the 
EU-27. These instruments have plenty of scope 
for improvement, in terms of their applicability 
as well as their implementation 
Both the MFF and EFSI are primed to tackle 
investment deficiencies and boost sustainability 
in the EU’s economic recovery plans. How can 
the EU make the most of the instruments it has 
at its disposal? 
SYNCHRONISING POLITICAL AND 
BUDGET CYCLES IN THE NEXT 
MFF 
In 1988, the European Commission, headed by 
Jacques Delors, put in place the first financial 
In the perspective of the post-2020 
Multiannual financial Framework (MFF), 
this policy brief suggests three reforms that 
would improve the aim of the MFF as both 
an expression of EUs political priorities 
and budgetary planning tool. It looks into 
the potential overhaul of the MFF timeline, 
its structure in the context of new 
instruments such as the EFSI, and the 
strategic combination of different EU 
financial tools intended to stimulate and 
interconnect economies across the EU-27. 
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framework, which was originally dubbed the 
'financial perspectives system'. These financial 
perspectives were meant to provide a clear and 
predictable picture of the EU’s long-term 
spending plans. Initially it covered a period of 
five years (1988–1992). In 1993, the framework 
expanded from five to seven years, mainly 
because of the increased usage of multi-annual 
projects. However, a debate opened up over the 
MFF’s timeline due to multi-annual sectoral 
agendas, increased competences of the 
Parliament, and the growing disparities between 
financial and political cycles (five years term of 
office for the European Parliament and the 
Commission vs seven years for the MFF). The 
Lisbon Treaty confers a legal basis on the MFF 
and, more importantly, specifies a minimum 
(and recommendable) timeframe of at least five 
years. 
A switch from seven to five years is not, 
therefore, uncharted territory. The five-year 
planning span has already been used, and a 
reversion to that timeframe would be 
appropriate today. Firstly, it would result in 
considerable institutional relief – no treaty 
change is required as Article 312.1 TFEU 
already endorses the legality of such an action. 
Secondly, apart from the considerable budgetary 
reshuffle exercise triggered by Brexit, the 
prevailing timeframe and circumstances offer 
optimal conditions, as there are two more years 
remaining before the end of the current MFF.  
Discussions over the post-2020 MFF are already 
brewing1 among the institutional negotiators, 
such as the Commission, Parliament, national 
governments and current and future EU Council 
presidencies. As usual, each institutional party 
and each government brings their own vision to 
the negotiating table, and the debate goes up to 
European Council level. The Commission 
usually makes the most of the EU’s annual 
budget of approximately 1% of the EU GNI; 
the Parliament focuses on spending on long-
term projects, and each Member State 
approaches the negotiations mostly through the 
lens of its national spending preferences. The 
months needed to reach a political agreement on 
the post-2020 MFF make the debate around the 
MFF’s timeframe essential for the future of EU 
finances. 
Economic realities show that the reasons for a 
seven-year MFF are very likely obsolete. In 
practice, current planning is anything but 
functional, especially from a political point of 
view. Indeed, MFF negotiations tend to be 
acrimonious and time-consuming, and one 
might claim that a seven-year timeframe clears 
those negotiating tables for a longer period. 
However, the responsibility that comes with the 
adoption of a five-year financial plan obliges the 
holders of EU mandates to deliver on 
commitments and vision for EU progress that 
match their own decisions on policy spending. 
Each Commission and Parliament should carry 
their own political and financial commitments. 
With a five-year timeframe, national 
governments would not be able to sideline the 
views of their political competitors at home. The 
political debate could also water down the 
national-centered tendencies of the European 
Council as it engages in the usual horse-trading 
over the MFF. 
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE MFF 
AND THE EFSI 
In 2014, the European Commission targeted the 
private sector’s aversion to risk when it launched 
EFSI 1, which drove the European Commission 
Investment Plan for Europe or ‘Juncker Plan’. 
The fund was designed jointly by the 
Commission and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) to encourage private sector 
contributions that would scale up the pan-
European economic recovery. The encouraging 
first results confirmed that the plan seemed to 
be an inspired approach, and, in 2016, the 
European Commission put in place a 2.0 version 
of the EU Investment Plan (‘Juncker Plan II’ 
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steered by EFSI 2), expanding its timeframe and 
capacity.2 
Given the Member States’ contributions to both 
EFSI 1 and 2 and MFF, another pertinent 
element of reform to pursue would concern the 
size and structure of the future MFF, in 
particular in relation to EFSI financing. Both 
EFSI 1 and EFSI 2 have used loan/debt 
guarantees to mobilise investments from the EU 
budget, whether from the Horizon 2020 or 
Connecting Europe Facility or other unallocated 
margins from the budget. This was a politically 
charged exercise in which institutional disputes 
made it difficult to decide which headings and 
financial instruments would be deprived of 
financing in favour of the EFSIs. If the 
Commission and the EU budget legislators have 
learned this lesson, they should consider 
including this new investment model of  
combining budget guarantees and actual 
contributions as a permanent feature of the next 
MFF  
Contributions also raise the eternal issue 
Member States' worry about: the logic of return 
balance. In fact, Member States’ participation in 
and understanding of this investment pattern of 
partnering with the EIB, the EU budget and 
Member States’ contributions, is crucial for the 
future design and stability of European finances. 
Since the Juncker Plan 1.0 came into force, 
national budget contributions to the EFSI have 
been deductible from the deficit ceiling imposed 
on Member States as part of the Fiscal Compact. 
EFSI 2 applies the same rule. Also, rather than 
contemplating the logic of return balance, 
governments should understand the greater 
leverage effect that a clearer view of the EU 
budget would bring versus caring exclusively for 
their national budgets. This would also facilitate 
the MFF negotiations and allow greater 
deductions from the deficit. If Member States 
realise the considerable advantages of thinking 
European when it comes to budget 
contributions, then these economies of scale will 
materialise only with the implementation of big 
interconnecting projects that are risky for their 
economies. 
WHEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPENDING 
MEET AT THE COMMISSION 
EU Member States have their own national 
public spending capital, but they also benefit 
from a multiplier effect provided by the EU 
through EU budgetary instruments. The 
European Commission and Member States 
share the management of these instruments (the 
European Structural and Investment funds or 
ESI; special financial instruments). In practice, it 
now seems more important to close the 
efficiency gap for public investment to ensure 
effects in the real economy. For this reason, the 
parallel approaches of the 2014 and 2016 
Juncker Investment Plans in targeting private 
sector risk aversion are a solution that address 
market demands. 
Emphasis should be placed on an approach that 
combines the two main types of EU financing 
mechanisms: the EU budget tools and the newly 
designed EFSI. The strategic and efficient 
complementarity between the EFSI through EU 
and EIB financing on one the hand and the 
traditional EU budget spending funds and 
instruments of ESI or other special financial 
instruments on the other, is another component 
intended to streamline the financing 
mechanisms.  
Public spending always seeks a political purpose. 
Funds from the existing EU budget are currently 
designed to fill a public spending gap in what 
governments consider worthwhile to cover, 
while one requisite of a functional EU economy 
is responsiveness to the market’s needs. The 
EFSI’s objective is therefore to mobilise private 
spending to fill the private investment gap. The 
proposed mechanism aims to achieve this by 
encouraging investors to address riskier – but 
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future-driven – projects while equally addressing 
the important dimension of the 
interconnectivity of markets in the EU. 
The institutional EU framework of overall 
financing, be it at EFSI or EU budget levels, 
also needs special attention. The partnership 
between the European Commission and the 
EIB in the EFSI should streamline the entire 
process of managing the financing and awarding 
of investment projects throughout the EU. 
According to EFSI procedures, the choice of 
projects is now the prerogative of an investment 
committee that is part of the EFSI governance 
bodies. Committee members should only show 
impartiality and vision for cohesion throughout 
the EU, with real remedies for its disparities and 
real justifications for the EU added value. The 
management model should include 
transparency, in particular on issues such as 
publication of the criteria and the justification of 
the bidding project choice. This component is 
essential as beneficiary governments often tend 
to disagree with the practice, considering their 
sovereignty to be estranged by bureaucratic 
institutions that could be subject to political 
influences. 
Given the difficulties certain private and public 
actors from Member States face in applying for 
projects, it is essential that the European 
Investment Advisory Hub (EIAH) is indeed the 
go-to source. It is important that it ensures fair 
assistance to the network of partner institutions, 
including national promotional banks, and that it 
takes into account actors from Member States 
where this type of bank does not exist. 
CONCLUSION 
The current system for coordinating European 
economies is no longer practical. Economic 
growth in the EU appears to be trapped in a 
slow-paced and unequal recovery. New financial 
solutions such as these investment incentives 
mentioned above have the potential to unlock 
this pattern. The EFSI financing model has 
proven itself in practice,3 and efforts to improve 
its performance could result in it becoming a key 
financing model for a European economic 
relaunch.  
Of course, the new instruments would need 
implementation adjustments. These could range 
from the simplification of access to funding 
procedures, to enhanced assistance for Member 
States with weaker records of financing 
applications.  
In the future, the advantages of a shorter and 
restructured MFF, together with a strategic 
combination of the EFSI scheme aimed at 
private spending and the funds and instruments 
of the EU budget, greater simplification and less 
resource waste during the political negotiation 
processes on financial resources or the MFF. 
Finally, Member States should be encouraged to 
manifest their genuine commitment to promote 
the schemes, explain the implications of new 
economic solutions, and, most importantly, 
apply the proposed improvements.  
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